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Abstract: This article proffers a critical reflection of South Africa‟s post-1994 constitutional 
trajectory, with specific emphasis on interpretation, application, enforcement and realization of first, 
second and third generation rights as potential panaceas to challenges inhibiting socio-legal 
transformation. It forges an adoption of an interdisciplinary approach, relying extensively on 
theoretical connotations founded in Klare‟s conceptualization of Transformative Constitutionalism 
and social change, the traditional rights-based approaches to human development and well-being, and 
Amartya Sen‟s and Martha Nussbaum‟s Capabilities Approach. It utilizes these theories as tools of 
analysis, to essentially evaluate their potential impact when tested against prime values grounded in 
the doctrine, Ubuntu, which informs Africans‟ philosophy of life, often distinguishable amongst 
proletariats. These tools are utilised to make an assessment of material socio-economic conditions 
afflicting indigent communities, in an effort to provide explanations regarding identifiable gaps 
existing in social policy and strict legal norms and/or instruments. It is asserted that Klare‟s TC and 
the Constitution‟s rights-based approaches will remain hollow lest not augmented by strong 
ideological instruments that are people-centered. Thus, it is indispensable that the Constitution‟s 
social transformation agenda, as an ongoing process, be complemented by ideologically sound 
approaches that adequately safeguard the well-being of humanity. 
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1. Introduction 
At the center of attention in this article is the idea of inspiring better thoughts in 
respect of Ronald Dworkin‟s (2001) notion of putting the Constitution in its best 
light as far as South Africa‟s processes of social, political and legal transformation 
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are concerned. Fundamentally, the article borrows from Dworkin‟s interpretation 
theory, which is grounded in constitutionalism. It also relies on section 39 of the 
Constitution which obligates courts to promote foundational values that underlie a 
democratic setting founded on dignity, equality and fundamental freedoms. 
According to Van Marle (2009), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (hereinafter, the Constitution) requires interpretation strategies that resonate 
the country‟s socio-economic transformation agenda. This is mainly because South 
Africa has a distasteful history of social and economic exclusion under which 
people‟s social security were determined on racial basis. Distribution of resources 
was also premised on discriminative planning strategies, which inherently stifled 
human development on the part of majority of people.   
But, eventually, and when apartheid became untenable, South Africa transited into 
a dispensation which envisioned a comprehensive societal transformation. This 
would have to be an all-encompassing change which would be bound to essentially 
alter material social and economic conditions created by the erstwhile apartheid 
system of governance, and which inadvertently had to be inherited by the 
constitutional democratic state amongst its primary responsibilities. This entails 
that the post-1994 legal systems inherited an enormous duty to secure societal 
stability and human well-being in the end. Worth mentioning is the fact that the 
well-being of society can best be attained when every person has adequate access 
to basic commodities needed to sustain a healthy prosperous living. This illustrates 
that there ought to be notable acceptance that every human being is worthy of 
respect, protection, and should thus be afforded an enabling environment within 
which to exercise their freedoms and simultaneously develop their own 
capabilities.   
Fast forward, and twenty-three years later, South Africa is still struggling to uproot 
such social challenges inherited from apartheid. Instead, the country remain 
besieged with acute social inequalities, rising poverty levels, economic 
deprivations and diminishing employment prospects, all of which represents the 
contemporary prime challenges in as far as social development and human welfare 
are concerned. Indubitably, these phenomena were deeply entrenched under 
apartheid, and somewhat, it is difficult to measure the presence of any notable 
improvements in practical sense owing to never ending population dynamics in 
particular. Thus, it is crucial to engage in a continuous process of interpreting and 
navigating the law in the Constitution in the direction that, when put in its best 
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light, it will enable the country and its citizens to, in a meaningful way, destroy 
social and economic structures embedded under apartheid.  
Therefore, this article attempts to provide an alternative thinking through which to 
augment the Constitution‟s and Klare‟s „social transformation‟ anecdote. This is 
significant in an effort to destroy a gradually settling narrative that the local 
democracy accepted and or legitimized apartheid‟s social inequalities under which 
the previously disadvantaged communities stand no chance of meaningfully 
escaping destitution. 
 
2. Rationale and Research Approach 
This article interrogates Klare‟s narrative of „social change‟ in his famous 
conceptualization of Transformative Constitutionalism (TC). Klare‟s TC 
distinctively describes South Africa‟s constitutional change and transition into the 
post-1994 democratic dispensation. The article fundamentally highlights that lack 
of proper ideological framework, and an understanding and implementation of 
constitutional dictates, especially those relating to foundational values and rights-
based approaches and basic human entitlements that underpinned the struggle 
against apartheid, is responsible for slow pace towards the realization and 
enjoyment of human rights. In the end, this adversely affects prospects of attaining 
human well-being, stability in society and sustainable livelihood. The article 
intends to illustrate that lack of commitment by, in the main, the political 
leadership and other public functionaries, both in public and private entities, whose 
functions impact on peoples‟ lives is responsible for sluggish pace of the country‟s 
social transformation. It evinces that there is lack of clear and coherent ideological 
strategies informing how the Constitution ought to be applied, and the fundamental 
functions and/or ambitions for which it is destined. Eventually, the Constitution 
will become a quiet conservative instrument, most favorable to those better 
positioned to understand systems of governance. Further, the Constitution would be 
perceived as favoring those in possession of resources to enforce it. And, in the 
extreme, it will incessantly be perceived as an instrument which protected social 
arrangements established under apartheid. Philosophically speaking, no efforts 
have been made to empower state functionaries, in order that they may understand 
dogmas that inform law and service to people. 
At the center of attention, this article addresses the research questions; what ought 
to be understood as fundamental constitutional imperatives that prompted the 
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„social transformation‟ narrative, which was essentially relied upon in the coining 
of Transformative Constitutionalism by Klare? Further, does the Constitution 
pragmatically support socio-economic transformation? And how does it envisage 
that this be achieved? It also laments why Klare did not clearly explain the „social 
change‟ in full?  
Against this backdrop, I shall identify specific aspects that feature as strong legal 
norms and social change imperatives, without which social change will hardly be 
realized. The article intents to inspire new thoughts about prospects of augmenting 
strict rights-based approaches to human development with realistic approaches that 
embraces diversity, yet directly addressing imminent challenges afflicting society. 
It is for this reason that the article stresses the need to encourage formulation of 
combined strategies when it comes to interpretation, application, enforcement and 
realization of the Constitution social transformation and human rights ideals. It 
formulates a new model named, „Mashele Rapatsa’s Fundamentals of Life 
Approach’, an approach which emphasizes on the need to identify basic resources 
needed for human beings to constantly achieve and sustain a better life, and then 
creating an enabling environment within which such can be consistently 
maintained. This approach stresses that rights, as basic human entitlements, require 
going beyond simply documenting them in legal texts. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This theoretical framework comprises two parts. The first section critically 
describes legal anecdotes drawn from Klare‟s Transformative Constitutionalism 
(TC), especially its position on social change. It should be noted that although 
social change became an essential part South Africa‟s post 1994 legal systems, 
Klare, in his conceptualization of TC, did very little if not nothing, to explain the 
content of this crucial phenomenon. The second section discusses specific elements 
of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum‟s Capabilities Approach as they concern 
human well-being, and is relevant to discourses that deal with societal stability. 
3.1 Transformative Constitutionalism (TC) 
The post-1994 legal structure opted for the constitutional supremacy system of 
governance, which subscribed to the theory of constitutionalism. Under 
constitutionalism, government action must be legitimate and subject to justification 
at all times (De Ville, 2003; Burns, 2003). In terms of section 2 of the Constitution, 
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settling for constitutional supremacy entailed that the Constitution would be the 
supreme law of the republic, and that any law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid. Most importantly, at the center of attention was and still remain the whole 
question of transforming the country from its repugnant past, to build a united and 
socially coherent nation. In the main, the Constitution embedded fundamental legal 
and normative frameworks that accentuated the post-1994 dispensation‟s primary 
duty to alter social and economic conditions of ordinary South Africans, 
particularly the previously disadvantaged communities (Rapatsa, 2015, p. 1).  
Subsequently, Klare coined Transformative Constitutionalism, which he used to 
describe the nature of the post-1994 Constitution. He posited Transformative 
Constitutionalism as a „long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation 
and enforcement committed to transforming a country's political, legal and social 
institutions, and power relations in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian 
direction‟ (1998:146). Klare emphasized that the Constitution offered an enterprise 
to induce major social change through non-violent political processes immensely 
grounded in law (1998:150). However, it should be noted that Klare did not fully 
explain the narrative or content of such social change and how the Constitution 
ought to drive it. Hence this article. 
Van Marle (2009, p. 288) perceived Klare‟s Transformative Constitutionalism as a 
theory which encompasses an approach to the Constitution and law in general that 
is committed to transforming political, socio-economic and legal practices in a 
manner that it will radically alter existing assumptions about law, politics, 
economics and society in general. Further that the Constitution is made 
transformative not only because of its traditional accounts of the rule of law, but 
because of its capacity to reach out to other disciplines such as philosophy, political 
theory and sociology. But how is this helpful if socio-economic situations of 
majority of those who were excluded by apartheid remain unaltered? It might as 
well suggest that alternative strategies ought to be sought in order to effectuate the 
Constitution‟s legal and social norms. 
Interpreted from socio-political and legal perspectives, Pius Langa (2006, p. 352) 
asserted that TC epitomizes a constitutional commitment to heal wounds of the past 
and guide us to a better future. He posited that it encompassed transformation as a 
process, a continuous ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates a space in 
which dialogue and contestation are truly feasible, where new mechanisms of being 
are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected, and in which change is 
unpredictable but the idea of change is constant (Langa, 2006, p. 354). While it 
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may be accepted that the Constitution carried an essential function of building a 
new nation, this is not realizable in the absence of a nationally accepted ideological 
connotations by all citizens. 
3.2 The Capabilities Approach (CA) 
The Capabilities Approach, at least, offers fundamental doctrines that may be 
relied upon in order to properly interpret and analyze the effectiveness, or lack 
thereof, of Klare‟s Transformative Constitutionalism narrative on social change. 
The CA was first conceived by Amartya Sen. It is concerned with functionings 
(person‟s achievements or what a person may value doing or being), capabilities 
(freedoms a person enjoys) and agency (ability to act in pursuit of what one values) 
(Sen, 1985, p. 203). Sen formulated the CA as a tool to evaluate human well-being 
in society. That is, to determine successes in human life, certain elements ought to 
be accepted as primary determinants. Sen constructed a strong relationship between 
education, development and freedom (Sen, 1999), and the rights language.  
The CA was later expanded by Martha Nussbaum as a special species of human 
rights approach (2007, p. 21) and a normative tool to serve and enrich our common 
humanity (1992, p. 214), owing to its ability to resolve deprivations afflicting 
humankind, the previously disadvantaged, women and the poor (2006, p. 48). Both 
Sen and Nussbaum emphasizes that the CA is best suited to evaluate well-being, 
and in this case, it can be used to assess whether social change has meaningfully 
permeated the Constitution‟s rights-based approaches. The CA embraces a 
humanist stance which seeks to safeguard „a better life for all’, a popular slogan 
which was adopted by the African National Congress (ANC) after nine-teen 
nineties. The CA also offers an alternative discourse in policy terms, concerning 
modern instrumental practices (Wright, 2012, p. 421). Hence, the CA possesses an 
intuitive strength to reinforce legal norms if applied concurrently with the 
Constitution‟s fundamental values of human dignity, equality and fundamental 
freedoms. The CA theoretical underpinnings provide coherent methods in terms of 
which to assess social change. 
Because this article identifies specific elements that are considered as crucial 
preconditions for social change, it is essential to relate such aspects with those 
propounded upon by Sen and Nussbaum. Such aspects include access to education, 
which plays a significant role in increasing people‟s chances of achieving better 
social security, protection of human dignity, achievement of equality and security 
of persons in general. Sen (1992, p. 44), in one of his founding texts, held that 
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education is a crucial basic capability, which is essential for human development, 
human well-being and social change. Nussbaum (2007) uses phrases such as sense, 
imagination, thought and practical reason on her list of central capabilities, to 
express education as a crucial capability, which she identifies as significant 
towards enhancing other central capabilities. Wright (2012, p. 417) has also 
emphasized the integral nature of education in regard to expanding other 
capabilities.  
 
4. Constitutional Norms and Social Change 
Philip Hamburger (1989, p. 240) asked if the framers of the United States 
Constitution understood that changes in society would also require change in terms 
of how the US Constitution is interpreted and applied. This question is also 
relevant to South Africa, where it is crucial to question how the crafters of the post-
1994 Constitution perceived and anticipated the law in the Constitution to be at the 
forefront of facilitating alteration of social arrangements established under 
apartheid. This is essential because the Constitution is perceived as being 
transformative in nature, even though it does not, understandably though, in clear 
terms, provide a clearly defined ideological framework needed to facilitate such 
social change, which Klare also did not appropriately conceptualize. But the 
question which would have been critical at the time, and which is still relevant 
today, is, on establishing the potential impact of clear ideological strategy, inclined 
to such social change in practical terms? Nonetheless, it is somewhat 
understandable why Klare did not postulate such a framework, and it is attributable 
to the fact that, in his own words, he was skeptical whether a comprehensive social 
change could be achieved through law-grounded processes, while he of course and 
emphatically believed that large-scale social transformation was indispensable 
(1998, p. 150). 
It is indubitable that the Constitution embedded normative and institutional 
frameworks that support rights-based approaches to human development. The 
author argues that this is, discernibly, one of the most salient strategies of 
attempting to facilitate social change as espoused by Klare. Such a setting is indeed 
convenient for strategic social change movement, which ought to fundamentally 
alter past injustices. Under these circumstances, and according to Summers-Effler 
(2002, p. 41), social structures must get repositioned, in which case social change 
will intermittently happen. The Constitution promised transformation whose 
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mission amongst others would be to achieve societal equality and social justice. 
Whether these ideals have been achieved it remains debatable but the challenges 
outlined in the section below may be suggestive that these objectives remain 
distant. The following aspects are considered as crucial legal norms and social 
values that are recognized as social change precursors, mainly because they are 
premised on safeguarding social justice and sustainable human development. 
4.1 Constitutional Legal Norms and Social Change Preconditions: The Basis 
of ‘Fundamentals of Life Approach’ 
a) Human Dignity and Social Change 
Section 10 of the Constitution entrenched the right to human dignity. Respect for 
humankind, and restoration of people‟s human dignity essentially informs South 
Africa‟s social transformation. The country‟s past necessitated a universal and non-
discriminate restoration of human dignity as a precondition for social change. This 
concept of human dignity is touted as a guiding instrument in the interpretation and 
understanding of all other human rights (Rapatsa, 2015, p. 43). Dignity on its own 
accepts that human beings are exceptional creatures whose human worth should 
never be suppressed (Cohn, 1983), and or no person may deliberately be devalued 
or treated in a humiliating manner (Chaskalson, 2002, p. 137). Much reliance on 
the law to protect human dignity derives from the fact that law emanates from 
social construction of what is perceived as correct and normatively acceptable. It is 
for this reason that the crafters of the Constitution inadvertently and somewhat got 
preoccupied with the idea that protecting dignity is necessary to facilitate social 
change. This dignity, both as a legal norm and a human right, ensured that all rights 
in the Bill of Rights find expression with ease. 
b) Equality as a Legal Norm and Social Virtue  
The Constitution protects the right to equality through section 9. The need for 
equality in society emanates from an ideal which sought to destroy harmful social-
grouping hierarchies that are deliberately premised on disadvantaging other 
persons. It is a justice orientated aspiration of law (Sturm, 2003, p. 51). It is 
described as a substantive legal norm which carries a strong moral force, and which 
requires that all persons be respected and protected by their governments 
(Greenawalt, 1983, p. 1183). Under apartheid, law was effectively used to entrench 
inequalities and social instabilities. This created huge social and economic 
disparities, mostly affecting the natives, which culminated in widespread material 
disadvantages that remain noticeable even today. Therefore, the Constitution 
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inherited a fundamental duty to disentangle inequalities in order to advance social 
transformation, and extend the reach of wide arms of the law to those in desperate 
need. It is for this reason that there is a direct connection between equality as a 
legal norm and a social virtue. 
c) Education as a Right 
The right to education is protected in terms of section 29. It is trite that every 
country needs an educated citizenry in order to register significant progress on 
issues such as social cohesion and social justice (Rapatsa et al, 2016, p. 42). 
According to Sen (1992, p. 44), education is a crucial basic human capability. 
Hence, the Constitution entrenched it not only as a right, but as a human 
capabilities enhancer. The role of education in advancing social change derives 
from its ability to safeguard cognitive empowerment. To articulate education as a 
basic capability, Nussbaum uses phrases such as Senses, Imagination, Thought, 
Emotions and Practical Reason as central capabilities. Nussbaum‟s view begins on 
assumption that human nature allows persons to possess and use own senses, 
forming into imagination and thoughts, to have freedom of expression and practice 
all these entitlements freely (and in an educated manner).  
This entails that education enables citizens to understand dynamics that play out in 
society‟s developmental and transformational issues. But how must education and 
its entire access question is conceptualized? To effectuate education of society, it is 
indispensable that all factors that make learning environment conducive become 
what will form the basis of capabilities enhancing. That is, we ought to remove all 
structural obstacles that impede effective teaching and learning. It entails that states 
ought to ensure that social conditions are conducive for such a right to be fully 
claimed and enjoyed. For instance, states need to build institutions, create the much 
needed schools‟ infrastructure, and provide materials and technical assistance to 
advance effective teaching and learning. In turn, this advances social change. 
d) Right to Social Security 
Section 27 of the Constitution entrenched social security as a right, and obligated 
the state to ensure its progressive realization. Since then, the state‟s provisioning of 
access to basic necessities has permeated every sphere of decision making in 
government, which Thabo Mbeki thenceforth linked with the concept of restorative 
justice (MacGregor, 2006, p. 53). Access to social security would have been 
perceived as a precondition for progression of social change and societal stability. 
When majority of citizens lack social security, the social change cannot be realized. 
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The inclusion of social security as a right was underpinned by the need to 
progressively eradicate trends in inequalities and the disturbances emanating from 
the poverty phenomenon. In a nutshell, social security would encompass ideals 
which Scott and Macklem (1992) described as social rights, which if realized, 
would guarantee access to adequate quality of life. Social security covers items 
such as quality education, health care, housing or shelter, food, water and harmless 
environment among others.  
e) Safety and Security of Persons 
In terms of section 11 of the Constitution, everyone must be protected from torture, 
violence, cruel and inhumane punishment and detention without trial. The state 
carries the utmost obligation to safeguard these entitlements and ensure that no 
person or institution infringes on them against any person. This derives from, 
among others, apartheid experiences under which people were tortured and or 
detained unreasonably for merely being in town or racially demarcated areas. To 
advance social change, the Constitution entrenched an intuitive normative value 
system which prohibited the use of force, either by the state or private persons or 
entities against any person. 
  
5. Challenges 
5.1 Lack of Coherent and Sustained Ideological Strategy 
The emergent of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the mid-
nineties produced some understanding that there was a need for harmony, that both 
the victims of apartheid and its perpetrators had to reconcile and forge towards 
building one unified nation. Desmond Tutu famously described the aftermath of the 
TRC as a „rainbow nation‟. The TRC, and in furtherance of the Constitution‟s 
foundational values, attempted to embrace and propagate the view that we are one 
nation and shall live side by side with each other. However, other than the hollow 
„rainbow nation‟ slogan, no national ideology was subsequently formulated and 
embraced by all. This void in terms of national ideology has resulted in 
discrepancies in terms of national identity, social identity and social direction. It is 
for this reason that numerous social and economic problems are still predominantly 
race-based, and this is because nothing informs our common humanity and how 
communal solutions ought to be invented. Despite the presence of long lasting 
principle of Ubuntu, no adequate effort was also made to inculcate common ideals 
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about what we represent as a nation. The doctrine of Ubuntu is accepted as 
resonating universal values of human worth and dignity, and has helped advance 
the transformative ideals in society thereby fostering social cohesion (Eliastam, 
2015:2) and social change in the end. Hence, this article evinces that the 
Fundamentals of Life Approach acquires its strength from Ubuntu because it 
provides dependable normative guidance regarding interdependence of humankind. 
5.2 Racial Biases and Stereotypes 
Just as it was under apartheid, there is still a challenge of „us‟ and „them‟ among all 
race groups. Although the Constitution envisioned burying wounds of the past, 
racial conflicts in particular, as propounded by Pius Langa, racially motivated 
tensions remains a widespread reality. Even though causes of such tensions have 
not been officially studied and analyzed, the author argues that they supposedly 
range from misconceptions on racial supremacy and or inferiority stereotypes, 
skewed land ownership patterns, pervasive historical underdevelopment, 
systematic patterns of racial privilege and so forth. Thus, this is purely a 
psychological issue, which requires creative responses that recognizes the need for 
interventions geared towards a psychological healing process. 
5.3 The VIPsm Quagmire 
Rapatsa (2016) has coined VIPsm, and argues that it emanates from a trending 
phenomenon known as „VIP(s) - Very Important Person(s)’. VIPsm is 
characterised by an abnormal state of categorizing or classifying human beings 
according to status or wealth or positions they occupy in society. It is particularly 
rife among political parties, and in government where political leaders or state 
functionaries/officials demand extra-special treatment and recognition by virtue of 
position, wealth or status, rather than their contribution towards serving humanity. 
Invariably, this trend cannot be congruent with the social change aspiration, 
especially because a substantial amount of (public) state resources (often limited), 
get budgeted for and or at times diverted from where they are needed most, to 
service egos of the elite capitalists. In fact, this is the most awful when compared 
with apartheid deliberate racially repressive laws, because often resources that are 
supposed to improve the livelihood of indigent communities are diverted to fulfil 
egocentric desires of politicians and or such other public functionaries. Often 
opulence is prioritised, at the expense of access to primary goods, all of which 
contradicts Karl Marx‟s (1844) ideas on freedom, emancipation and access to basic 
necessities of life, whose works are heavily cited during campaigns for votes.  
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5.4 The Dual System of Service Delivery: Public-Private Service 
South Africa suffers yet from another soundless sickness known as public-private 
service. That is, a system under which there are public institutions and private 
institutions, both of which deliver essential services to citizens. However, such 
public institutions, which are intended to serve everyone, predominantly poor 
communities, are poorly resourced and generally underperforming. This is in 
contrast to private entities that are generally better performing, partly because they 
are highly funded and well-resourced (financially, infrastructure and human 
resource). This is particularly rife in relation to access to health (private hospitals 
or health care clinics), education (private schools), security (private security), food 
and several others basic amenities of life. Under such circumstances, it is 
impossible to realize real social change particularly because majority of citizens 
remain excluded from the enclave of better life and social security safety net. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This article has validated the argument that the constitutional inclusion of social 
and economic rights, alongside civil and political rights, epitomized the 
Constitution‟s transformative outlook, particularly in terms of social relations, and 
molded its ability to facilitate social change, attainment of human well-being and 
societal stability in general. Thus, it is indisputable that the Constitution 
successfully embedded resilient normative frameworks which entrenched a wide 
range of solid legal norms, that are also capable of resolving social challenges if 
properly conceptualized. It is therefore deducible that the crafters of the post-1994 
Constitution were unwittingly conscious of the well enunciated social 
transformation imperative, without which legal norms would be effectively 
meaningless. 
However, the past twenty-three years of the democratic dispensation tells that the 
country still faces multiplicity of social, economic and political challenges, all of 
which have a significant bearing on the well-being of humans, social peace, social 
justice and social stability. In fact, things seem to be getting out of hand on a daily 
basis. Certainly, this presupposes that there is a huge void, and the author believes 
that the absence of practical ideological connotations aimed at reinforcing 
constitutional legal norms is one such missing link. Hence, the Fundamentals of 
Life Approach is proposed, which advocates for a socio-legal approach to 
interpretation of first (civil and political rights), second (social, cultural and 
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economic rights) and third (right to development, environmental rights etc.) 
generation rights. The Fundamentals of Life Approach operates on the premise that 
the Constitution, in isolation, irrespective how strong its rights-based legal norms 
are, would not sufficiently advance social change. Therefore, there is an urgent 
need to harmonize legal tools and social thinking, and ensure that crucial elements 
dictating on human development are all embraced and given true effect in practical 
sense. Most importantly, the Fundamentals of Life Approach entails looking at 
rights, and linking them with social issues and understanding their impact on social 
change and human well-being. In this article, only a set of five indicators of social 
change were selected. That is, human dignity, equality, education, social security 
and security of persons. Accordingly, the Fundamentals of Life Approach 
emphasizes that whereas these norms should be embraced as key rights, they 
should also be understood as central elements that are capable, and thus needed for 
facilitating real social change. It is asserted that such an approach is panacea to 
noted challenges. 
The Fundamentals of Life Approach stresses that, henceforth, all rights in the Bill 
of Rights ought to be interpreted and understood as precursors of social change, a 
departure from the apartheid awful past to a newly defined common future. 
Further, that rights must not only be understood as legal entitlements and legal 
tools through which to hold government accountable, but should equally be 
perceived as means to greater social ends. Lastly, the concept of Ubuntu embodies 
prime values underpinning social change. It is asserted that the application of the 
Constitution‟s transformative agenda must be interpreted in such a way that it gives 
effect to the Fundamentals of Life Approach, which generates an added impetus 
from the doctrine of Ubuntu, whose primacy is on securing human worth, 
interdependence, social peace and justice and sustainable human development 
among others. 
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